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 ABSTRACT 
 
Europe’s performance relative to the US and countries in Asia is a topic that greatly 
preoccupies policy-makers who are concerned that the EU is losing ground compared 
to other, more dynamic parts of the world. Although the recent crises in Asia gave a 
timely reminder that the grass often looks greener on the other side of the fence, this 
paper points to trends in EU performance that European policy-makers will find 
disconcerting. Productivity growth has slowed down relative to competitors. Export 
competitiveness has deteriorated in all areas except agriculture and raw materials. The 
losses have been most manifest in the technologically most sophisticated industries, 
particularly ICT. Europe has also failed to create employment on a scale at all 
comparable with the US or Japan, with obvious repercussions for unemployment. 
While until recently there was a tendency towards convergence in productivity and 
income between European regions, there are now signs of a reversal of this trend. 
Redressing this relatively disappointing performance will be neither easy nor quick, 
but if enduring answers to Europe’s problems are to be found, it is essential that the 
scale and nature of these problems are carefully diagnosed and solutions found. This 
paper  argues that the problems that Europe faces in key areas such as growth, equality 
and employment are all related to its failure to take sufficient advantage of 
technological advances, particularly the ICT revolution. Consequently, a coherent 
European strategy for upgrading technological capability and quality competitiveness 
is long overdue. This cannot be limited to providing support to selected industries (or 
companies) in order to make them more competitive in global markets. Rather, what 
Europe has to do is to take steps to embed new technologies in society. This should 
bring together macro-economic policy, regulation, science and technology policy, and 
employment initiatives. The complementarities between policy areas, in particular, 
should be stressed.   
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1. INTRODUCTION1 
Europe’s performance relative to the US and countries in Asia is a topic that greatly 
preoccupies policy-makers who are concerned that the EU is losing ground compared 
to other, more dynamic parts of the world. Although the recent crises in Asia gave a 
timely reminder that the grass often looks greener on the other side of the fence, this 
paper points to trends in EU performance that European policy-makers will find 
disconcerting. Productivity growth has slowed down relative to competitors. Export 
competitiveness has deteriorated in all areas except agriculture and raw materials. The 
losses have been most manifest in the technologically most sophisticated industries, 
particularly ICT. Europe has also failed to create employment on a scale at all 
comparable with the US or Japan, with obvious repercussions for unemployment. 
While until recently there was a tendency towards convergence in productivity and 
income between European regions, there are now signs of a reversal of this trend. 
Redressing this relatively disappointing performance will be neither easy nor quick, 
but if enduring answers to Europe’s problems are to be found, it is essential that the 
scale and nature of these problems are carefully diagnosed and solutions found.  
 
 
2. A LONG VIEW 
In terms of productivity (as measured by GDP per capita) Europe seems to be 
surpassed not only by the US, but also by Japan and – if the trends from the past 
decades prevail in the next century – by a number of other Asian economies as well. 
How did this happen? One or two centuries ago, the situation was entirely different. 
During most of the nineteenth century the UK was the leading capitalist country in the 
world, with a GDP per capita about 50 per cent above the average of other leading 
capitalist countries (Table 1). However, during the second half of the century, the US 
started to catch up with the UK and eventually – around 1910 – surpassed it. In 
retrospect it becomes clear that US growth was based on a new technological system, 
based on large-scale production and distribution systems well suited for the large, fast-
growing and relatively homogenous American market (Chandler, 1990; Nelson and 
Wright, 1992).  
                                              
1 This paper is based on a recently published book from the project, «The economic challenge for 
Europe: Adapting to innovation-based growth» (Edward Elgar, 1999). I wish to thank my co-authors, 
particularly Iain Begg, Paolo Guerrieri and Bart Verspagen, for their permission to use our joint work 
for this purpose. 
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 That Europe initially failed to take advantage of these innovations is perhaps not so 
difficult to explain. The European markets were smaller and less homogenous. Hence, 
it is not obvious that US methods, if applied to European conditions in this period, 
would have yielded superior results. This is what Abramovitz (1994) has dubbed a 
lack of ‘technological congruence’. Two world wars and an intermediate period of 
protectionism and slow growth added to these problems (Abramovitz, 1994). Hence, 
the US lead increased even further and peaked around 1950, when GDP per capita in 
the US was about twice the European level. 
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Table 1. GDP per capita in the industrialised world, 1820–1994 (1000 1990 US$ per head) 
         Growth Growth 
 1820 1870 1910 1950 1970 1980 1990 1994 1820–1950 1950–94(90) 
           
USA 1.3 2.5 5.0 9.6 14.9 18.3 21.9 22.6 1.5 2.0 
Japan 0.7 0.7 1.3 1.9 9.4 13.1 18.5 19.5 0.8 5.3 
Germany 1.1 1.9 3.5 4.3 11.9 15.4 18.7 19.1 1.0 3.4 
France 1.2 1.9 2.9 5.2 11.6 15.0 17.8 18.0 1.1 2.8 
Italy 1.1 1.5 2.3 3.4 9.5 13.1 16.0 16.4 0.9 3.6 
United Kingdom 1.8 3.3 4.7 6.8 10.7 12.8 16.3 16.4 1.0 2.0 
Canada 0.9 1.6 3.9 7.0 11.8 16.3 19.6 18.4 1.6 2.2 
Belgium 1.3 2.6 4.0 5.3 10.4 14.0 16.8 17.2 1.1 2.7 
Netherlands 1.6 2.6 3.7 5.9 11.7 14.3 16.6 17.2 1.0 2.5 
Korea    0.9 2.2 4.1 9.0   5.8 
Taiwan   1.0 0.9 2.7 5.6 10.3   6.0 
Hong Kong    2.0 5.3 10.0 17.1   5.4 
Europe (6)           
Mean 1.3 2.3 3.5 5.2 11.0 14.1 17.0 17.4 1.0 2.8 
Coeff. Of Var. 0.18 0.26 0.22 0.21 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.05   
          
All countries except Asian 
NICs 
         
Mean 1.2 2.1 3.5 5.5 11.3 14.7 18 18.3 1.2 2.7 
Coeff. Of Var. 0.25 0.35 0.32 0.38 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.10   
           
All countries           
Mean    4.4 9.3 12.7 16.5   3.3 
Coeff. Of Var.    0.59 0.4 0.32 0.21    
           
Source: Fagerberg, Guerrieri and Verspagen (1999) based on data from Maddison (1995) and data  kindly 
supplied by Angus Maddison . 
 
Notes: 1. For Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong, the final period is 50–90, not 50–94. 
          2. Europe (6) is the six European countries in the table. 
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While the period between 1820 and 1950 was one of divergence in economic 
performance between leading capitalist countries, the following period has generally 
been one of convergence. The productivity gap between the US and Europe has been 
significantly reduced. This reduction, most of which occurred during the 1950s and 
1960s, was related to the potential for rapid productivity advance in Europe through 
imitation (of superior US technology). European production and exports in industries 
such as cars, domestic electrical equipment, electronics etc. grew rapidly from the 
1950s onwards. The gradual reduction of barriers to trade within Europe from the 
1950s onwards has generally been regarded as an important contributing factor to this 
process, as has the general rise in living standards (Abramovitz, 1994; Maddison, 
1991). 
 European countries were not alone, however, in exploiting the window of 
opportunity given by superior US technology. From the 1950s onwards Japan, later 
joined by other Asian economies, aggressively targeted the very same industries as 
those that had grown rapidly in Europe (Johnson, 1982; Wade, 1990). Initially this did 
not give much reason for concern among European policy-makers or industrialists. But 
during the 1970s and 1980s it became evident that Japanese suppliers outperformed 
their European and US competitors in many cases, and that this could not be explained 
solely by low wages. In became clear that the Japanese, as the Americans before them, 
had made important innovations in the organisation of production, innovations that 
have led to both increased quality and higher productivity (Von Tunzelmann, 1995), 
and which US and European competitors – despite serious efforts – have not yet 
managed to imitate to the extent that they would have wished.  
 While Europe, Japan and other countries started to catch up in many typical 
‘American way of life’ products, US industry leaped forward in another area; science-
based industry, in part due to massive public investments in R&D during the Second 
World War and the «cold war» that followed. Gradually, however, European countries 
and Japan started to devote more resources to science and R&D (Table 2). By the mid-
1970s many of these countries used a larger share of their available resources on civil 
R&D than did the US. Hence the US lead started to be challenged in this area as well. 
Following the Japanese example, some of the Asian NICs started to invest massively 
in R&D from the 1970s onwards.  
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Table 2. Estimates of non-defence R&D as a percentage of 
GDP (selected years) 
     
 1963 1973 1981 1993 
     
USA 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 
Japan 1.4 1.9 2.4 2.8 
Germany 1.3 2.0 2.4 2.3 
France 1.2 1.5 1.7 2.1 
Italy 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.3 
United Kingdom 1.5 1.6 1.9 1.8 
Canada 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.6 
Belgium 1.0 1.4 1.4 1.6 
Netherlands 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.0 
Sweden 0.9 1.4 2.0 3.0 
Switzerland 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.6 
Korea 0.3 0.3 0.8 2.3 
Taiwan 0.4  0.7 1.8 
     
Europe (6)     
Mean 1.3 1.6 1.7 1.9 
Coeff. Of var. 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 
     
All countries except Asian NICs   
Mean 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.1 
Coeff. Of var. 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 
     
All countries     
Mean 1.2 1.4 1.7 2.1 
Coeff. Of var. 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 
     
     
Source: Fagerberg, Guerrieri and Verspagen (1999) based on 
data from OECD Science and Technology Indicators Database 
and UNESCO/national sources (Korea, Taiwan). 
 
Note: Estimates of civil R&D are available for most OECD countries for selected years. These estimates show 
that for all but a few countries (notably the USA, the UK, France and Sweden) differences between civil and 
total R&D are small. Hence, for some countries and years, total R&D is used instead. Since data are not always 
available annually, the data reported here will in some cases be based on information from a preceding and/or 
following year. For definition of Europe (6), see Table 1. 
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 During the 1980s European catch-up vis-à-vis the US came to a halt, while Japan 
continued to increase productivity at a faster rate than both the US and Europe. As a 
consequence Japan now enjoys a higher level of GDP per capita than Europe. The 
Asian NICs (Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan) have – at least until recently – continued 
to experience very rapid productivity growth, i.e., to catch-up relative to the US and 
other countries.  
 
 
3. EUROPE IN THE GLOBAL MARKET 
Technological catch-up (or lack of such) and structural changes are intimately related 
with trade performance. In fact, one of the striking findings from studies of successful 
catch-up is that it is associated with both a general improvement in trade performance 
and a radical change in the composition of trade. For instance, the catch-up of Europe 
and Japan in scale- and capital-intensive technologies from the 1950s onwards was 
associated with rapidly increasing export market shares for products embodying these 
technologies. However, since then the locus of growth within manufacturing has 
changed to science-based industries.  
 How has Europe adapted to these changes in the global market? To answer this 
question we will, following work by Pavitt (1984, 1988) and Guerrieri (1992), make 
use of a taxonomy in which industries are allocated to sectors depending on the nature 
and sources of technological knowledge. In principle such taxonomy could have been 
applied to both goods and services, but because of data limitations we confine the 
analysis here to the former. The taxonomy identifies five type of industries: 
agricultural products and raw materials, traditional manufactures, scale-intensive, 
specialised suppliers (of various types of machinery, instruments etc.) and, finally, 
science-based industries (such as professional electronics, pharmaceuticals and 
aerospace). The two former depend largely on technology developed in other sectors, 
while the two latter are typical «technology producing» sectors serving the entire 
economy. Scale intensive industry is in an intermediate position in this regard, it 
receives a lot of its technology from others, but it also has significant in-house 
technological accumulation (learning). Among these industries, science based industry 
has displayed the highest growth recently. Between 1970 and 1995 the share of 
science based products in total world trade more than doubled, largely at the expense 
of agricultures and raw materials (Fagerberg, Guerrieri and Verspagen 1999).  
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 Table 3 reports market shares (ratio of national exports to world exports) for four 
major players in the global economy, Europe (15), the United States, Japan and the 
Asian NICs between 1970 and 1995. The market shares for Europe reported in the 
table include intra-European trade, and this explains why Europe’s market shares are 
so high compared to the United States and Japan. However, similar calculations were 
made excluding intra-European trade, and the trends (changes through time) - which is 
what commands interest here - were basically the same. Between 1970 and1995 Japan 
and the Asian NICs gained market shares at the expense of the US and Europe. In 
particular, the Asian NICs showed a spectacular performance; between 1970 and 1995 
its overall market share increased more than five times, from 2.1 to 10.8 per cent of the 
global market. It is also noteworthy that the rapid growth of Japan and the Asian NICs 
was accompanied by very rapid structural changes that totally changed the 
specialisation pattern of these countries. In the case of Japan, in spite of overall market 
share growth, the market shares for traditional and scale- intensive industries actually 
contracted, while those of specialised suppliers and science-based industry increased 
rapidly, so that by the end of the period Japan had its major strength in the latter 
(followed by scale-intensive industry). For the Asian NICs a similar development took 
place, with a much stronger growth in science-based industry and specialised suppliers 
than in the traditional area of strength (traditional industries).  
 In contrast to the Asian experience, both Europe and the US lost overall market 
shares. Moreover, these losses were generally more manifest in high- technology 
sectors, particularly science-based industries, than elsewhere. As a consequence, in the 
1990s Europe was no longer specialised (i.e., having an above average market share) 
in science-based industry. The only area in which Europe gained market shares was 
agricultural products and raw materials. Hence, European competitiveness, whether 
measured through its growth or trade performance, is deteriorating. Moreover, slow 
growth and declining market shares, particularly in the most advanced and fast-
growing industries, go hand in hand with increasing unemployment problems (Table 
4). 
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Table 3 Market shares 1970–1995 (ratio of national exports to world exports*, per cent) 
        
  Agricultural and Traditional  Scale- Specialised  Science- Total 
  raw material Industries intensive Suppliers Based  
  Products      
        
Europe 1970 24.1 57.0 55.7 61.2 48.6 44.6 
(15) 1988 30.3 47.6 51.2 56.0 41.3 44.0 
 1995 31.6 40.1 47.3 47.6 33.8 39.6 
 Change       
 1970–95 7.5 -16.9 -8.4 -13.6 -14.8 -5.0 
        
US 1970 13.1 7.4 14.5 22.3 29.5 14.8 
 1988 13.4 5.2 9.4 12.2 19.8 11.6 
 1995 11.0 6.7 10.3 13.7 17.9 11.8 
 Change       
 1970–95 -2.1 -0.7 -4.2 -8.6 -11.6 -3.0 
        
Japan 1970 1.2 9.3 13.8 6.4 7.7 6.7 
 1988 1.1 4.1 17.1 15.6 16.7 10.1 
 1995 1.4 3.2 12.8 15.7 14.3 9.0 
 Change       
 1970–95 0.2 -6.1 -1.0 9.3 6.6 2.3 
        
Asian NICs 1970 2.0 6.1 1.0 0.8 1.0 2.1 
 1988 2.6 14.5 5.6 4.0 9.1 6.7 
 1995 3.4 16.2 8.7 8.8 17.8 10.8 
 Change       
 1970–95 1.4 10.1 7.7 8.0 16.8 8.7 
        
Europe (15): Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, 
  
 Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United 
Kingdom. 
 
Asian NICs: Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan.     
* Goods exports (trade in services not included). For the definition of sectors see Fagerberg, 
Guerrieri and Verspagen 1999, appendix to chapter 1. 
Source: Fagerberg, Guerrieri and Verspagen (1999) based on UN and OECD data from the SIE 
World Trade data base. 
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Table 4 Unemployment as a percentage of the total labour force 
 1960–1973 1974–1979 1980–1989 1990–1995 
Europe (15) 2.3 4.6 9.2 9.8 
USA 4.8 6.7 7.2 6.4 
Japan 1.3 1.9 2.5 2.5 
Korea Na 3.8 3.8 2.4 
 
Source and definitions: Fagerberg, Guerrieri and Verspagen (1999) based on data from OECD 
Historical Statistics 1960–1995. 
 
 
4. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
It is pertinent to ask what European integration has to do with all this. 40–50 years 
ago, when the first steps towards the present-day European Union were taken, priority 
was initially given to the creation of a common market for natural resource-based 
industries such as the coal and steel industries and agriculture. Because of the political 
sensitivity of these industries, the steps towards a common market were often 
combined with subsidies for high-cost, uncompetitive producers, and in many cases 
these subsidies became of a permanent (or semi-permanent) nature. In agriculture, a 
strong and costly incentive scheme was created, the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP),that encouraged agricultural production. As a result, Europe has become self-
sufficient for most agricultural products and a problem of surpluses has occurred, that 
is being resolved through among other things subsidised exports. Hence, it comes as 
no surprise that Europe has increased its market shares internationally for agriculture 
and raw materials. 
 The other main element in the European economic integration process has been a 
continuous drive towards economies of scale through enlargement and 
homogenisation of markets. After the Second World War various schemes were 
developed in order to facilitate trade across national borders in Europe. From the late 
1950s onwards a process of trade liberalisation took place within two European 
trading blocks, EEC and EFTA. By the early 1970s internal trade in manufactures was 
virtually free of tariffs and other restrictions within these two blocks. These 
developments clearly strengthened the catch-up of Europe in many scale-intensive 
industries previously dominated by US industry such as cars, domestic electrical 
equipment and consumer electronics.  
 The drive towards economies of scale through enlargement of markets continued in 
the 1970s with the integration of the member countries of the two former trading 
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blocks, EEC and EFTA. By the mid-1980s Western Europe had become a free-trading 
area for manufactures. However, this failed to produce positive growth effects of the 
type that had been associated with previous integration efforts. Partly as a result of this 
the EU launched its plan for a revitalisation of the internal European market (‘Europe 
1992’). This plan was based on the idea that there were large unexploited economies 
of scale in European industry, the exploitation of which had been prevented by the 
existence of so-called ‘non-tariff barriers’ to trade, commonly assumed to be related to 
discriminatory actions by governments in one way or another. Hence, the heart of the 
plan has been to abolish these barriers. The fact that Europe’s trade performance has 
been slightly better in scale-intensive industry than in manufacturing as a whole, 
indicates that although it is difficult to detect an effect on overall growth, the strong 
emphasis on scale in European integration efforts may have had an impact on its 
pattern of specialisation. 
  To sum up, European integration has favoured natural resource-based and scale-
intensive industries, and this is consistent with the observed change in its pattern of 
specialisation. However, given that modern growth is increasingly knowledge-based 
(Fagerberg, 1994), it seems relevant to ask to what extent this move away from the 
technologically most advanced and fast-growing parts of manufacturing poses a 
problem for Europe’s future growth and welfare.  
 
 
5. CHALLENGES FROM INNOVATION-BASED 
GROWTH 
Traditional economic theory tells us that specialisation is beneficial in itself because it 
leads to more efficient use of available resources. However, unless this has a positive 
effect on technological progress (so-called ‘dynamic economies of scale’), it will not 
lead to higher growth in the long run. Our research (Begg et al., 1999) shows that what 
matters for growth and competitiveness is not so much increasing the degree of 
specialisation in general, as the ability to exploit areas of high technological 
opportunity, which in recent years have been dominated by ICTs.  
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Table 5. Some indicators on the use of ICT, 1996 
 Cellular 
phone (1) 
Internet 
hosts (2) 
Internet 
users (2) 
Personal 
computers 
(1) 
ISDN 
subscribers 
(2) 
Overall rank 
(3) 
Norway 28.7 34.2 113.8 28.5 10.0 1 
Finland 29.2 61.3 167.8 19.5 7 2 
Denmark 25.0 20.3 57.0 30.4 5.7 3 
US 16.5 37.9 78.8 36.2 3.3 4 
Switzerland 9.3 18.7 52.1 40.9 17.7 5 
Sweden 28.2 26.9 90.5 21.5 2.2 6 
UK 12.2 12.4 43.0 19.3 4.5 7 
Canada 11.4 20.1 66.7 24.4 0.1 7 
Germany 7.1 8.4 30.5 23.3 23.7 9 
Netherlands 5.2 17.4 58.0 23.2 6.4 10 
Japan 21.4 5.8 55.7 12.8 4.2 11 
Austria 7.4 11.0 37.2 14.9 5.2 12 
Belgium 4.7 6.4 29.5 16.7 5.4 13 
Ireland 8.2 7.6 22.7 17.0 0.0 14 
France 4.2 4.1 8.6 15.1 7.3 15 
Italy 11.2 2.6 10.2 9.2 1.8 16 
Portugal 6.7 2.4 23.2 6.7 2.0 17 
Spain 3.3 2.9 13.4 9.4 0.9 18 
Greece 5.3 1.6 14.3 3.5 0.0 19 
       
Europe (4) 8.8 8.7 29.7 16.9 8.4  
       
(1) subscribers per 100 inhabitants, (2) per 1000 inhabitants, (3) mean rank of previous 5 
columns, 
(4) weighted mean of countries above. 
Source: Dalum et al. (1999a) based on data from ITU World Telecommunications 
Development Report, 1998. 
 
 However, as pointed out above, during the last decades Europe has lost ground in 
the technologically most progressive industries, and ICT is no exception to this trend. 
In fact, the research shows that, with the exception of telecommunication equipment, 
Europe has fallen behind the United States and Japan as suppliers to non-EU markets, 
and is increasingly vulnerable in software and services as well (Dalum et al., 1999a). 
The diffusion of ICT products and services in Europe is also slow (Table 5), 
particularly when compared to the United States, and very uneven across Europe. 
While some smaller countries, especially the Nordic ones, have diffusion rates similar 
 15 
THE ECONOMIC CHALLENGE FOR EUROPE: ADAPTING TO INNOVATION-BASED GROWTH 
(or superior) to the US level, most countries in Europe (particularly in the South) are 
laggards when it comes to use of ICTs. 
 This raises the issue of what policy-makers can and should do to reverse this 
uncomfortable trend. Arguably, transforming the education and training systems in 
order to equip individuals with the skills needed for an environment in which the 
major new technology is pervasive should be high on the policy agenda. The 
continuing skill shortages in software testify to the failure of Europe to meet this 
challenge, and it is evident that this deficiency has slowed the diffusion of ICTs 
beyond the immediate sectors that developed and applied them. However, acquiring 
skills is only a necessary first step. Skills also have to be put to uses that maximise 
diffusion and learning. Therefore a combination of enhancement of skills and 
diffusion-oriented policies centred on social needs is required. Mobile 
communications in the Nordic area is a good example of how public regulation and 
support managed to bring together new technology, skills and existing social needs in 
a way that both led to rapid diffusion of the new technology and – through learning – 
the development of globally competitive firms and industries (Dalum, Fagerberg and 
Jørgensen, 1988). The possibility that similar policies also may work for other types of 
ICT applications should encourage policy-makers to experiment further with 
diffusion-oriented policies centred on users and social needs. 
 In a way the challenge for policy-makers is no less than devising solutions which 
restore the dynamism and creativity that characterised the European economy in 
earlier periods. Part of the answer has to do with getting a proper understanding of the 
‘system of innovation’, the mix of characteristics, infrastructure and policies that 
determines how well an economy is able to exploit opportunities afforded by new 
technologies. In fact, differences in invention and innovation would not matter much if 
knowledge spread readily from region to region. However, the research reveals that 
the greater the geographical distance between regions, the lower the degree of 
knowledge flows between them (Maurseth and Verspagen, 1999). Moreover, 
knowledge flows are greater within countries than between them, suggesting that the 
national element in innovation systems remains strong. The research also shows that 
knowledge flows are most intense between regions with similar or complementary 
specialisation patterns, as well as between technologically linked sectors. These results 
suggest powerful influences leading to the formation of geographically concentrated 
clusters of technologically related activities at work in Europe’s economy.  
 Economic and social cohesion – usually defined in terms of equity considerations 
such as regional disparities or social inclusion – is a fundamental aim of the EU 
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articulated in Article 2 of the Treaty. However, research shows that regional disparities 
in economic performance remain substantial, and have increased in many member 
countries in the last decade (Fagerberg and Verspagen, 1996; Cappelen, Fagerberg and 
Verspagen, 1999), see Table 6. This gap is especially marked as regards innovative 
activity. Hence, what seems to be a fairly robust finding is that there exists a subgroup 
of high R&D, high income regions in Europe with its own internal dynamics. What 
distinguishes these high R&D regions from the rest is mainly that R&D matter a lot in 
the former, while it is of little importance (or contributes negatively) in the latter. 
Thus, there is a risk that a faster rate of innovation, which is vital for European growth 
and competitiveness in general, might further aggravate regional disparities.  
 
Table 6. Dispersion of GDP per capita in EU regions and countries 1960–1995  
 1960 1970 1980 1995 
Regional standard deviation EU9 0.34 0.27 0.20 0.21 
National standard deviation EU9 0.26 0.23 0.18 0.17 
 
Share of total regional dispersion in EU9 due 
to: 
    
Between country dispersion in per cent 64 79 52 41 
Within country dispersion in per cent 36 21 48 59 
 
Note.  
Regional standard deviation measures the dispersion across European regions independent of which 
country the regions belong to. National standard deviation measures the dispersion across European 
countries (disregarding the dispersion between regions within countries). EU 9 includes Denmark, Be-
Ne-Lux, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy and UK. All figures based on PPS (purchasing power 
standard). The regional disaggregation is more detailed from 1980 onwards, and this biases the figures 
before 1980 for EU9 downwards.  
 
Source: Cappelen, Fagerberg and Verspagen (1999) based on data from EUROSTAT (REGIO Data 
Base) 
 
 Although data are scarce on many factors of potential relevance for regional 
growth, the evidence clearly indicates that most low-income regions have failed to 
exploit the potential for technology diffusion. This points to a need for policies aimed 
at enhancing the capacity of such regions to absorb new technologies, especially ICTs. 
Similar issues arise in relation to the eastern enlargement anticipated in the next few 
years (Grabbe, Hughes and Landesmann, 1999) The research also drew attention to the 
potential for the local science base, in the form of university research, to contribute to 
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local learning processes and, hence, regional development (Dalum et al., 1999b). 
Furthermore, the low rate of diffusion is often associated with a structure of activity 
dominated by agriculture or ‘older’ industries, and a corresponding lack of high-tech 
activities, often combined with relatively high unemployment. One strategy for change 
would be to reorient policies in this area towards accelerating structural change. But is 
its important to design policies in a way that does not lead to a further increase in long-
term unemployment, as this is itself a factor hampering diffusion and growth 
(Fagerberg, Verspagen and Caniëls 1997). 
 Perhaps the most important problem facing EU policy-makers is how to combat the 
persistent high rate of unemployment in Europe (Table 4), which threatens social 
cohesion. It is important to stress that innovation is, in itself, no ‘quick fix’ for 
unemployment. Product innovation may increase employment through increased 
demand for products embodying the new technologies. But process innovation aimed 
primarily at rationalisation of existing production processes may also reduce 
employment in a specific industry and/or location, if not compensated by indirect 
income and demand effects. In contrast to the situation in the other parts of the ‘triad’, 
the latter (employment-reducing) type of outcome is in fact the most common in 
Europe (Pianta and Vivarelli, 1999). This is especially evident in industry (Table 7). 
What this implies is that Europe’s industrial structure is orientated towards sectors 
most open to labour saving, mostly mature industries characterised by a high degree of 
process innovations. 
 
Table 7. The relationship between growth of employment and growth of GDP/value added (elasticity), 
1975-1996 
Country  Whole Economy Industry Services  
United States 0.6 0.4 0.6 
Japan 0.3 0.2 0.4 
Europe (15) 0.1 -1.2 0.4 
 
Source: Pianta and Vivarelli (1999) based on data from the OECD, UN and Datastream. 
 
 Thus the challenge for policy-makers is not only to increase innovation-diffusion, 
but also to do so in a way that is more ‘employment friendly’. This requires a shift 
from the traditional emphasis on process innovations and reduction of labour costs to a 
stronger focus on product innovations and increases in quality. It should be evident 
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that Europe can never hope to compete with newly industrialised countries in Asia and 
elsewhere on the basis of labour costs alone, and that the long-run outlook for Europe 
is also influenced by the quality of what it produces. The research shows that there is 
great scope for raising quality as the core competitive advantage of the EU through a 
strategy based on product innovation, upgrading of skills and increased R&D efforts 
(Jansen and Landesmann, 1999). 
 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS  
To some extent Europe’s current problems is the price to be paid for past successes. 
European integration, most recently through the single market programme, has made 
product and factor markets more open and paved the way for the realisation of 
economies of scale and a more efficient allocation of resources. From a long-run 
perspective, these policies have been extremely successful. Without them, it is 
doubtful whether Europe would have managed to catch up with the US to the extent 
that it did. However, the rewards to catch-up in capital- and scale-intensive sectors 
producing for the mass markets have been cashed in long ago, and now the rules of the 
game have changed. In the last decades, science-based industries, especially those 
drawing heavily on ICTs, have become the main driver of technological change and 
economic growth. Although the ICT revolution has been under way for a long time, its 
major effects are just beginning to be felt and it is clear that Europe’s performance in 
ICT, however measured, is far from satisfactory. It is our contention that a mere 
continuation of past policies will not suffice to reverse this discomforting trend. If 
appropriate steps are not taken now, it is our assessment that the current trends toward 
slow growth, increasing inequality and unemployment will continue, threatening 
social cohesion, the social model and the democratic values that Europeans hold dear. 
 The story is easily told. Slow growth is mainly the result of failure to exploit the 
technological opportunities inherent in new and fast-growing technologies. This is not 
mainly a question of failing to be competitive in, say, the production of computers or 
other products embodying ICT, but embedding the new technology in society at large. 
Regional disparities have been exacerbated by the very uneven diffusion of new 
technology, which has, hitherto, disproportionately favoured high-income, high-R&D 
regions specialised in high-tech manufacturing and – above all – services. By contrast, 
traditional agricultural regions or regions in the rustbelt have benefited very little if at 
all. Rather what has happened is that the relative prices of their products and factor 
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services have declined. High unemployment is the flip side of this coin. Europe’s 
continuing specialisation in increasingly mature industries characterised by labour-
saving innovation has meant that relatively few new jobs have been created. Low 
labour mobility has made matters worse by inhibiting effective redeployment of 
resources and has, arguably, been an impediment to technological advance (Fagerberg, 
Verspagen and Caniëls, 1997) 
 Although the diagnosis is clear, agreeing on remedies is much less easy. What 
makes the problem so challenging is the need for actors and trends at very different 
levels to pull together. On the one hand, as the research shows, the creation of 
technological advantage is in most cases a very local affair. At the other extreme, 
radical technological changes, particularly the ICT revolution, affect nearly all aspects 
of life, so that a holistic approach to change aimed at exploiting the opportunities 
afforded by these new technologies is needed. Because of path dependency in local 
technological, institutional and economic systems, and the complex conditions for 
getting the most out of ICT, this is very difficult to realise in practice. Thus, there is a 
large co-ordination problem here, and this emphasises the need for a strategic view on 
European growth. What is needed is in our view a much more prominent role for the 
EU, not only in policy co-ordination, but in discussing policy change, experimenting 
with policy alternatives, evaluating the results and providing benchmarking for 
government at various levels. Arguably, a much greater emphasis needs to be placed 
on stimulating more rapid, pervasive and effective innovation in technologies, 
organisations and institutions. 
 The core message from our research is that the problems that Europe faces in key 
areas such as growth, equality and employment are all related to its failure to take 
sufficient advantage of technological advances, particularly the ICT revolution. 
Consequently, a coherent European strategy for upgrading technological capability 
and quality competitiveness is long overdue. This cannot be limited to providing 
support to selected industries (or companies) in order to make them more competitive 
in global markets. Rather, what Europe has to do is to take steps to embed new 
technologies in society. This should bring together macro-economic policy, regulation, 
science and technology policy, and employment initiatives. The complementarities 
between policy areas, in particular, should be stressed. Equally, it is vital at the outset 
to recognise that change will not happen overnight and that boosting the long-run 
ability of the economy to create and use new technologies will require concerted 
action.  
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